From N.C.'s Writings
With the onset of summer, the Indian scene has perceptibly changed in the last few weeks, adding to its complexities as also to its instability.
In the eyes of many, the rumblings against the RSS inside the Janata camp reaching the point of a challenge against it on the part of the BLD-Socialist-CFD combine was considered a significant development and it was expected to facilitate the forging of an entente with all Congressmen committed to fight against the return of the Sanjay mafia, and then on to an understanding with the Communists, thereby providing the contours of a national platform against the two unwholesome extremes—Balasaheb Deoras' aggressively militant shakhas at one end, and Indira Gandhi's contrived rehabilitation of the Sanjay Youth Congress at the other.
It would have been naive to expect that such a perspective could be realised smoothly. The Jana Sangh, on its part, drawing its sustenance largely from the well-knit RSS, would not take things lying down. Hectic confabulations and painstaking efforts began, to fight back its possible isolation within the Janata Party and also desperate contacting of many outside: it is in this context that one has to understand the significance of Indira Gandhi's well-covered tete-a-tete with Eknath Ranade, one of Deoras' trusted lieutenants. Deoras, on his part, has interestingly revived his old line of forget-and-forgive towards Indira Gandhi.
After the setback suffered by the Jana Sangh in UP, the stage was set for the battle for Bihar. By now, the Jana Sangh could gain one more bridgehead; Jagjivan Ram chose to take the ex-parte decision to go against Karpoori Thakur: if Bahuguna had thrown in his lot irrevocably with the anti-RSS camp in UP, Jagjivan Ram with calculated timing gave a public testimonial to the RSS in a well-advertised press interview, and saw to it that his flock in Bihar joined hands with the Jana Sangh to overthrow Karpoori Thakur and displace from power the BLD-Socialist bloc. Although turncoating has been a matter of easy virtue in Jagjivan Ram's political career, the motivation behind this latest mini-defection on his part may be worth probing. One consideration that might have weighed with him in choosing to be on the right side of the Jana Sangh-RSS is that he would protect himself from the danger of being blackmailed on the question of personal fortune that he and his progeny have managed to acquire in substantial quantity over the years: the impression is widespread in New Delhi that the low-down on the fabulous land deal made by Charan Singh's Nephew-cum-Son-in-law Inc could be made available to the Indira Congress by the Jana Sangh sources as a tit-for-tat for Chaudhury's breach with the Jana Sangh. In contrast, Babuji's not-so-hidden deals are believed to be of epic dimensions.
Another impelling factor behind his preference for the company of the Jana Sangh-RSS is perhaps the expectation that in any coming struggle for Prime Ministership in the event of Morarji Desai despite his urine therepy making the exit, Jagjivan Ram would like to muster the support of the Jana Sangh group. This does not seem too far-fetched when one recalls that on the morrow of the landslide Janata victory at the March 1977 poll, the Jana Sangh leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee, was reported to have initially conveyed to Jayaprakash Narayan their preference for Jagjivan Ram as the Prime Minister—a move which was scotched by Charan Singh's veto at the time, thereby enabling JP to choose Morarji Desai for the coveted post.
All these fresh permutations and combinations have certainly not strengthened the position of the Janata nor have helped to refurbish its badly-stained image in the eyes of the public. If it is able to survive in office despite these rifts within itself, it is mainly because the forces ranged against it are not united and therefore not in a position to exploit the growing Janata disunity. The unity of the two Congresses seems to have been put off for good, thanks to Indira's exemplary attachment to her son. This very same tireless determination to promote her politically imbecile offspring has led to a sharp cleavage within the party over which she presides. With all the tub-thumping demagogy for a crusade against the Janata misrule, the recent session of her AICC with its record attendance has come to be noted for the public divergence between Devraj Urs and the Sanjay loyalists, with the latter known for having the blessings of the almighty Mother. Concurrently, Devraj Urs is known for his free-wheeling which saves him from any inhibition in keeping active contact with many a political lobby in the Janata as well as the Congress.
On the Left, the two Communist Parties, though observing for the present an uneasy ceasefire, have shown little signs of soon coming closer, and without such a united stand, Communist credibility in the overall national scene can never be substantive. Equally serious is the setback that they have suffered in consequence of the pathetic handling of the power crisis—the severest in history—by the CPM-led West Bengal Government. What is being questioned is not the arguments now being put up by the Left Ministry about the reasons behind this unprecedented breakdown in power supply, but the incredibility with which the State Government allowed the crisis to reach this breaking point. With its ideological distaste for the multinationals and Indian big business long overcome, one wonders why it could not work out a crash programme to improve the power situation during the two years in office. To trot out the excuse that the previous Congress Government was responsible for bad maintenance—however true that may be—does not cut much ice at this stage, while to blame the BHEL when it was not responsible for the majority of the units in West Bengal, betrays not only irresponsibility, but a touch of dishonesty unworthy of a Communist-led government. Incidentally the Left Front Govern-ment's clamour for denunding the Centre of powers vis-a-vis the States has not gained strength when it has had to send out an SOS to the Centre and the neighbouring States for power supply. The fact that there are no large-scale and violent disturbances in West Bengal today testifies to the clinging faith of the masses in the Left, but this goodwill cannot last for ever, as any goodwill cannot last for ever, as any demonstration of bankruptcy of competence in governance is bound to devalue the standing of the Left, signs of which can already be discerned. In this welter of growing confusion and the slump in the people's faith in existing political establishments, Vinoba Bhave's latest fast-unto-death for an outright ban on cow slaughter sharply brings out the danger of derailment of national life at the moment. With due respect for his age and piety, one finds it difficult to praise his wisdom—one need not forget how he was taken for a ride during the Indira Emergency which he had lavishly blessed as the anushasan parva. To put the Cow issue as Priority Number One before the nation is a demons-tration of petulance and provides a dangerous handle to the communalist forces.
The principled stand of Chief Ministers of West Bengal and Kerala on the issue refusing to comply with the patently unreasoned demand of Vinoba and his associates (who, incidentally, include the true-blood RSS at the moment) has a lot of latent support all over the country; at the same time, political parties anxious to cash in on any and every passing issue, have suddenly become Vinoba devotees, forgetting the dangerous implications to secularism that his quixotic stand spells out. A case in point is the stand of Indira Gandhi herself, who has no difficult in backing the Vinoba fast while protesting too much about her commitment to crusading against communalism.
The tragi-comedy of Vinoba's bovine partiality apart, the communal flare-up at Jamshedpur has brought to the forefront the potentialities of a new element for Indian politics. The calculated preparations for a communal clash, with the RSS playing its so-called “cultural” game in a dangerous fashion, arms stacks found in the hands of anti-social elements, and other political forces exploiting the explosive situation—these are not really new things, except that the RSS in Bihar was also interested in toppling the Karpoori Ministry. What is indeed serious and has far-reaching significance is the report, confirmed by many responsible journalists, that the armed police force of the State Government not only did not put down the clashes but refused to open fire when ordered to do so; instead, at a number of places, it sided with the majority in perpetuating a bloody pogrom on the Muslim minority, which included armed raids, arson and looting.
With such total breakdown of the law-and-order machinery—the inevitable fall-out of the sordid caste and communal politics which the Hindi belt, with Bihar in the lead, has per-fected—it is only the Army that has emerged as the saviour at Jamshedpur: there has been no communal taint attached to it and it has come out as the only effective instrument for putting down communal violence. The blatant communal record of the UP Provincial Armed Constabulary at Aligarh and the Bihar Military Police at Jamshedpur is proof of the fearful corrosion of the administrative machinery as politicians preoccupied with dirty factional games, coupled with unbridled corruption and nepotism, have made a mockery of government.
It is in this grim background that the emer-gence of the Army as the protector of life and property at Jamshedpur assumes significance. There is nothing wrong in the Army earning deserving bouquets, but when this synchronises with equally deserving brickbats for the politician, then a new element is added to the polity of a country. The all-round discredit of the recognised political establishments can no longer be a matter that can be contained in a vacuum. Wherever there will be disruption in the normal life of the people—whether through caste or communal violence or massive economic discontent—and the politician, Right, Left or Centre, is found in a state of devaluation, whether due to corruption or incompetence or both, the possibility of the Army emerging as the popular hero cannot be underestimated. Here lies the significance of the Jamshedpur happenings. Lately a spate of published writings has tried to show that the Sino-Indian war in 1962 was an unfought war, that the Army was not to blame, that it was the politician who meddled and should be held responsible for the debacle of the Indian jawan and his Generals. While there is a large measure of truth in all this, the overall upshot is that the Army and its top brass are acquitted of the stigma of defeat in 1962—undoubtedly an important political development in the present climate.
A new dimension seems to be intruding into Indian politics—and with good reason.
(Mainstream, April 28, 1979)